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Abstract--We present, in this paper, an alternative, optimization based formulation for "forward looking" 
models in economics, more commonly known as rational expectations models. For one basic scalar model, 
we study both finite and infinite horizon formulations under two different information patterns, and in 
each case we obtain explicit expressions for the unique solution without making any a priori assumptions 
on its structure. We then compare these results with other possible solutions obtainable using the 
traditional approach to rational expectations. The approach introduced here can handle higher order 
models as well as nonlinear ones, and also those where there is an additional exogeneous input controlled 
by a different set of agents. Some of these possible xtensions are briefly discussed in the latter part of 
the paper; others are left as challenging but highly promising problems for future research. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a large body of papers in the economics literature, which deal with the questions of 
well-posedness of, and existence and uniqueness of solutions to, "forward looking" dynamic 
models, more commonly known as rational expectations models. We cite, as a few representative 
papers on this topic, the works of Lucas (1975), Sargent and Wallace (1975), Barro (1976), Taylor 
(1977), Shiller (1978), Blanchard (1979) and Blanchard and Kahn (1980). The underlying dynamic 
models are "forward looking", because the future behavior depends explicitly on the expectations 
the agents have on the future itself; and they are called "rational expectations models", because 
the expectations on the future outcomes are (or should be) formed on some rational basis. One 
such (nontrivial) model which will primarily be the focus of our attention in the sequel, is given 
by the scalar difference quation 
Yt = ayt_ ] + bE,_ IY,+I + E,. (1) 
Here, a and b ~ 0 are constant parameters, {e,} is a sequence of independent zero-mean random 
variables with finite variance, and E,_Iy,+~,=E{y,+~],I,} is the conditional expectation of y,+~ 
based on some information, q,, available to the agents at time t. The subscript - 1 is used to 
capture the assumption that this information qt is based on the past values of the relevant state 
of the economy, that is {Yt-[,Yt-2,...} =:yt -¿ .  A common assumption is to let rh =y'-~; but 
other formulations are also possible, such as ~/, = z'-1, where z, denotes ome "noisy" measurement 
on Yt : 
z, = y, + ~t, (2) 
with {~, } being another sequence of independent, zero-mean random variables with finite variance. 
The basic question addressed in the literature over the years, rephrased in the above context, 
is whether there exists a (unique) stochastic process {y,} that satisfies (1) for all t of  interest. A 
common assumption, made primarily for the reason of tractability, is to let the time interval be 
infinite (on both sides), so that the stochastic process ought could be restricted to the class of 
stationary (or, most of the time, wide sense stationary) processes. Even in this class, the solution 
will, in general, be nonunique. For a simple illustration of this nonuniqueness, consider the model 
(1) with ~/t = Y'-~, and under the parametric restriction ab < 1/4. Introduce two scalars d÷ and d_ 
(compactly written as d± ): 
1 
d± = -~ [½ - ab +_ (1/4 - ab )l/2], (3a) 
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which are the two solutions to the second order equation (a + bd) 2 = d. Now it is not difficult to 
see that the stochastic process {y,} generated by 
y, = (a + bd+ )Yt- l + Et (3b) 
solves (1), for either value of d+, since E,_ tY,+t = d± Yt-~. Furthermore, by appropriately choosing 
a and b, one can ensure that la + bd+l < 1, so that the process {y,} is wide sense stationary whenever 
{E,} is. It turns out, as we will see later, that there are also other solutions to (1), for which E,_ ~y,+ 
depends not only on y,_ ~ but also on yt-  5, possibly infinite past. On the other hand, if we had 
to choose only between the two given above, then there is reason to believe (as also argued in 
Taylor, 1977) that the preference would go towards the one with lower error variance. Under this 
additional criterion we would eliminate the solution corresponding to d+ since 
var(y,+ 1 - Et- lY,+ l) = d_+ var(c,) + var(E,+ i), (3c) 
and d+ > d_. One appealing feature of the resulting solution (over others which are given by higher 
order ARMA processes) is that it is valid even if the initial and final times arefinite. For example, 
the process atisfying (1) could start at t = 0, with a given value for Y0, in which case the process 
(3b) will again solve (1). Such a finite horizon formulation would also allow for nonstationary 
shocks (E,), and possibly nonconstant values for a and b in (1). 
This prelude now brings us to the two fundamental questions that we raise (and resolve) in this 
paper. The first is whether one can come up with a finite-horizon formulation corresponding to 
(1) whose possibly unique solution would yield in the limit (as the time interval becomes infinite) 
a stationary solution for (1). This would provide a natural selection criterion among a large number 
of solutions to (1), and also form a natural basis for generating a dynamic decision process which 
would be compatible with the available information. Of course, the finite horizon model could also 
provide a better (more realistic) description of the cause--effect relationship of the agents' decisions, 
and therefore could be of independent interest. Our answer, in the paper, to this first question is 
in the affirmative. 
The second question we raise is a more subtle one, which involves a philosophical deviation from 
the model (1) without necessarily departing conceptually from the initial raison d'etre for 
formulating "forward looking" rational expectations models. To make our point, let us go back 
to (1) and reflect a little on the real meaning of the second (forward looking) conditional 
expectations term on its right hand side. This term, in fact, represents the aggregate decision of 
the economic agents as to their best estimate of some future state of the economy. In this sense, 
it is probably a better reflection of the reality to rewrite (1) as 
Y, = aYt- l + by, + E,, (4) 
where {v,} represents the aforementioned aggretate decision variable, chosen under the informa- 
tional restriction that v,=7,(q,), for some (general-measurable) function 7t. Now, the main 
rationale behind choosing y,(rh) as E{y,+ t I~/,} in (1) is to make v, as close as possible (in a certain 
sense) to y,+~, with one criterion leading to such a (unique) choice being, with t isolated, 
min E{(7,(q,) - y,+,)2}. (5) 
7t 
We maintain that the starting point for any rational choice for v, should be a criterion such as 
(5), and not directly the conditional expectation E,_~yt+~. In fact, since the problem involves 
multiple stages, the economic agents are not interested in minimizing the variance in (5)for a 
particular t, but rather its cumulative over a//t  of interest. Hence, in a realistic scenario, (5) should 
be replaced by 
T 
jr..=min y' E{(~,(rh ) _yt+~)2}p,-S, (6) 
{Vt} t=s  
where the minimization is subject to the dynamics (4), with v, = 7,(r/,). Here [s, T] is the time 
horizon, which could also be infinite, and p denotes a positive discount factor (0 < p ~< 1), with 
p = 1 implying that prediction errors at all stages are given equal weight and emphasis. We submit 
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the policy optimization problem (6), together with (4), as a strong alternative to (1). It is perhaps 
similar to (1) at a conceptual level, but departs drastically from it at the technical level along with 
the ensuing economic interpretation. For example, because of the spillover terms across stages, it 
is generally not true (see Section 2 for justification) that the input of (1), v, = Et_ lY,+I, solve (6). 
A further advantage of dealing with the policy optimization problem (6) is that it can also handle 
problems with time-varying parameters and finite horizon, which may better model realistic 
situations. 
It is this alternative formulation for rational expectations that we will study in the main balance 
of this paper, under two different ypes of measurement processes, q,= y'-1 and r/, = z t - l ,  Existence 
and uniqueness of the solution to the finite horizon dynamic policy optimization problem (6) will 
be established, and properties of the solution, including its limiting behavior as the time horizon 
becomes ufficiently large will be analyzed (Sections 2 and 3). Furthermore, a finite horizon version 
of (1) will be formulated, and it will be shown to admit a unique solution, the limit of which (as 
time horizon goes to infinity) captures the minimum variance solution (3b) with d = d_ (Section 
4). Discussions in Section 5 on extensions to other forward looking models, as well as to models 
with additional exogeneous control inputs will conclude the paper. 
2. THE SOLUTION TO THE POL ICY  OPT IMIZAT ION PROBLEM:  
THE PERFECT MEASUREMENT CASE 
In this and the next section, we provide a complete solution to the policy optimization problem 
(6), (4), with v, = V,(r/,), first for r/, =y, -1  (perfect measurements) and then (in Section 3) for 
q, = z'-~ (noisy measurements). Initially we take T and s finite; set s = 1, without any loss of 
generality, and leave T an arbitrary integer. Furthermore, we take Y0 as a second-order random 
variable, independent of the sequence {Et}r__+l ~,as well as {~t}r=0 for the noisy case. To complete 
the description, we have to specify the terminal conditions on the problem. Consistent with the 
criterion (6), we assume that the prediction process by the economic agents ends at t = T, and that 
there is no effort to predict (or any interest in forecasting) the value of yr+2; accordingly we set 
Vr+ 1 = O. 
Under the above specified side conditions, the unique solution to the problem with perfect 
measurements is presented in Theorem 2.1 below, after giving a condition (Condition 2.1) which 
is generally satisfied. We should note (as an advance warning to the reader) that, in the statement 
of the theorem the information q, = y t -1  has been replaced by rTt = (y'- i ,  v'-1), without any loss 
of generality, since both generate the same sigma field--v s being measurable with respect o the 
sigma field generated by yS- 1, for all s < t. 
Condition 2.1 
Let {x,}~=r be a sequence generated by 
ab 
x , _ l=  l - - -  x r= l -ab  ¢O.  (7) 
Xt ' 
Assume that x, does not vanish for any t > 1. [] 
Theorem 2.1 
Let Condition 2.1 be satisfied. Then, the dynamic policy optimization problem (4), (6), with 
perfect measurements and s = 1, admits the unique solution 
v* = 7"(r7,) = g,Y, - i  + fl, v ,_ , ,  
= ml  moYo, 
where ct, and fit are given by 
2 <<. t <<. T ; 
t= l ;  
~, = - [ab  - pm,n,x,a] / [b ~ + pn, x2], 
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and nt, m, are defined recursively by 
n,_~ = 1 - b f l t -  pntx2/[b 2+ pn,x~]; nr = 1, (10a) 
rot_ 1 = (1 - x,_ l)/b - a/[1 - brat]; mr  = a. (10b) 
The minimum value in (6), that is the lowest possible discounted cumulative prediction error 
variance is 
j r  = kl + nlm~ var(El), (1 la) 
where kl is the last step in the backwards iteration 
kt_ ~ = pkt + (1 + pntm~)var(et); 
k r  = var(er+ 1). (1 lb) 
Proof. See Appendix A. [] 
An interesting feature of the solution given in Theorem 2.1 is that the best predictor policy for 
the economic agents is a linear function of the most recent measurement and the most recent policy 
input, and thus has a finite dimensional representation even if s~-  oo, instead of s - -1.  
Furthermore, because of the recursive computation of the coefficients ~, and fit in (8), the optimum 
policy is time-consistent, for all t > s + l, not only on but also off  the optimum path. A 
mathematically precise statement for this time-consistency can be given as follows: If {7*},r= l is the 
solution to the problem defined on the time interval [1, T], then for all t > l, the truncated version 
{7p}f=t solves JT_ 1 for arbitrary but fixed v,_ 1 and Yt-1, regardless of the past decisions. (A 
justification for this statement follows from the proof of Theorem 2.1 given in Appendix A.) Yet 
another appealing feature of the solution is that the minimum cumulative rror variance is 
independent of the statistics of the initial state Y0; it depends only (and linearly) on the variances 
of the shocks (Et) into the system. A consequence of this observation is that as the shock variances 
go to zero, j r  also goes to zero, thus leading to perfect foresight in the limit. 
One natural question to ask at this point is whether the equality v* = E,_ lY*+ 1 holds, where {y*} 
represents the corresponding path satisfying 
y* =(a  + bo~t)y*_ I + bfltv*_~ + et, y*  =Yo; (12) 
v* = o~ty*_ I + fltv*_l, v* = 0. (13) 
As to be expected, the equality does not hold (in a sense, v* "does better" than E,_~yt+l).  We 
postpone an indirect verification of this to Section 3 where we obtain a unique solution to (4) on 
the time interval [1, T], under the restriction v, = E~_ tY,+l, which is different from {y~*} generated 
by (13). What we show below, however, is that the equality holds asymptotically (as the length 
of the time horizon goes to infinity) and hence the limit of (8) (in the sense to be clarified below) 
provides a solution to (1) in the absence of any side conditions. Toward this end, it will first be 
useful to analyze Condition 2.1 and the limiting properties of the sequence {x,}. 
Lemma 2.1 
(i) Condition 2.1 is satisfied whenever ab <~ 1/4. For ab > 1/4, the set of values of the product 
ab for which Condition 2.1 is not satisfied is finite. (Hence, the condition is not satisfied only on 
a set of (Lebesque) measure zero.) 
(ii) Let {x~ r. 1 be the sequence generated by (7), where T is also considered as a variable. For 
ab <~ 1/4, and every finite t, 
lim x~=~ = ½[1 + (1 - 4ab)'/2]. (14) 
T~o¢ 
For ab > 1/4, the sequence does not converge. 
Proof. Introduce the new sequence {~b t }P=0 where O,,=x r_ , -~ .  This new sequence is generated 
by 
/ \ 1 -~ 
t#t+l=[7 .  - ]~t ;  t~0=l -ab-~.  
\~ , .x /  
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For O<ab <~ 1/4, the sequence {~,} is positive and strictly decreasing, since 4)o>0 and 
0 < 1 - ~ < £. Hence, 
implying that 
lim 4), = 0, 
l 
lim xr_,  = ~, 
t 
which is equivalent to (14). Furthermore, for ab = 0, ~b, = 0 for all t I> 0; hence (14) stands proven 
for 0 ~< ab <~ 1/4. As a by-product we obtain the result that x r> ff > 0 for all t ~< T, thus proving 
part (i) of the Lemma for 0 ~< ab <~ 1/4. 
For the range of values ab < 0, we introduce a subsequence of {~b, }, denoted {q~, }, where t~, = ~b2,. 
This new sequence is generated by 
,+ ,=~ ~+-~-~ju',, q~0=l -ab  -~,  
which is again a positive, strictly decreasing sequence since (1 - ; )2< ~2 and 4) 0 > 0. Thus, 
lim $2, = lim ~t = 0, 
t t 
which further implies that 
lim ~2,+ i = 0, 
t 
since [(1 -x)/(q~2t + x)] is bounded. (Note that {q~,} itself is not monotonic, but {~b2, } is, which 
makes {~b2, +l} bounded and have a decreasing envelope.) Hence, 
lim xr_,  = ~, 
t 
for ab < O. 
To complete the proof of part (ii), it will be sufficient o observe that the difference quation 
(7) does not have an equilibrium point for ab > 1/4, and hence the sequence cannot converge to 
a limit for those values of the parameters. To complete the proof of part (i), on the other hand, 
we first note that for ab < 0 the sequence generated by (7) is positive and hence satisfies Condition 
2.1 automatically. Second, we note that in region ab > 1/4, each xe can be solved recursively as 
a rational function of ab (i.e. as a fraction with both numerator and denominator being polynomial 
functions of ab). Since there is only a finite number of x,'s (T - 1 of them), and each numerator 
polynomial has only a finite number of zeroes, the final statement of part (i) readily follows. This 
completes the proof of the lemma. [] 
In view of Lemma 2.1, we have to restrict the parameter space to ab <~ 1/4, if we are interested 
in the limiting behavior of the solution presented in Theorem 2.1. Under this restriction, and using 
the same interpretation for m r, n t r, • r, flr as in x r introduced in Lemma 2.1, it almost immediately 
follows that 
lim m r = (1 - .~)/b,=th; 
T 
lira n r __ O; 
T 
lira er__ -a /b ;  lira fir__ 1/b. 
r T 
In the above the second limit may require some explanation; all others are by mere substitution. 
To obtain the result, we let ~ = b:/px~ in (10a) (note that x, # 0 by Lemma 2.1), and rewrite the 
recursion as 
n,_l =n,/[n,+~2,]; nr= 1, 
which clearly generates a positive strictly decreasing sequence, converging to zero. 
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The above now implies that, as the time horizon becomes ufficiently long, the optimum policy 
(8) converges to the s ta t ionary  policy 
v, = 7"(~I,) = - (a /b )y , _~ + (1 /b )v , _ t .  (15a) 
When substituted in (10), it yields 
y* = vt_ i + El (15b) 
as the equilibrium path generating equation, along with (15a). 
Two observations are in place here. The first is the validity of the equality 
E, - lY*+l  = E,_l(V,+ E,+,) =v,, (16a) 
which shows that the stochastic process generated by (15) is in fact a solution to (1). The second 
observation is that the per-stage steady-state prediction error variance is 
var(y*+ l - E,_ lY*+ l) = var(E,+ t), (16b) 
which is lower than (3c). This is in fact the best one can do if the sole purpose is minimization 
of the steady-state prediction error variance, since 
var(y, + ~ - E,_ ~y, + ~ ) = var(E, + l ) + var(ay, + bv, + i - E , _  ~ y,  + ~ )
>/var(E, + i ). 
We now summarize these results in the following theorem. 
Theorem 2 .2  
Assume that ab <<. 1/4. Then, the infinite horizon version of the dynamic policy optimization 
problem (4), (6) admits a unique optimum stationary policy, given by (15a). Furthermore, the 
corresponding path, generated by (15), constitutes a minimum prediction error variance solution 
to (1). [] 
Remark .  Note that the latter part of the statement of the theorem is the strongest possible, since 
minimality is against all possible linear or nonlinear structural forms of Et - lY t+~ in (1). The 
literature, heretofore, has exclusively dealt with linear structural forms. A second point that is 
worth making here is that even though for the finite horizon problem the restriction v, = Et_  ~y, + t 
is an unnatural one (because of the spillover across stages), we find (at least within the domain 
of the model adopted here) that the effect of the correlation across stages dies out as the time 
horizon grows, thus making v, = Et_  ~yt+~ a natural choice. In spite of this, the advantage of 
viewing the infinite horizon problem as the limit of a finite horizon dynamic optimization problem 
should be apparent here, since it produces the best possible solution (in the minimum variance 
sense) to (1). [] 
The sequence of finite horizon problems used in the construction of the limiting solution in 
Theorem 2.2 were those where no prediction was made at the last stage, i.e. Vr+ ~ = O. Even though 
this is a natural side condition to impose, since Yr+2 does not enter the optimization problem, one 
might still be interested in finding out how the result of Theorem 2.2 would be affected if Vr+ l were 
not taken to be zero, say an arbitrary linear function in the same form as (8): vr+ ~ = (tyr + l~Vr. 
To explore this somewhat, we first note that the statement of Theorem 2.1 would then remain 
intact, with only the boundary conditions (10a) and (10b) changed to 
nr  = (1 - b]~)2; m r = a + b~. (17a) 
This also leads to a corresponding change in the terminal condition of (7): 
Xr  = 1 - ab - b2(t. (17b) 
The following counterpart of Lemma 2.1 (ii) now follows from an almost identical proof (to that 
of Lemma 2.1): 
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Lemma 2.2 
Let {x,r}rt=~ be the sequence generated by (7), where the terminal condition is now (17b). Let 
ab <~ 1/4, and a be such that 1 -ab  -Yc  > dtb ~. (Note that a ~< 0 always satisfies this condition.) 
Then 
lim xt r = $ = ½[1 + (1 - 4ab)1/2]. 
T 
For ab > 1/4, the sequence does not converge. [] 
Hence, as long as a satisfies the condition of Lemma 2.2, the limiting value for {x~, and 
consequently those of {m ~, {n r}, {~ ~, fl~ remain the same (and independent ofa), implying that 
even if vr+ ~ is not chosen identically zero, the statement of Theorem 2.2 could be true. There is 
therefore, a large class of finite horizon problems (larger than the class initially formulated) which 
yield in the limit the stationary policy (15a). 
3. THE NOISY MEASUREMENT CASE 
We now address the problem of obtaining the optimum solution to (6) when the information 
available at time t is r/, = z ' -1 ,  where z, is a noise corrupted version of y,, as given by (2). We take 
all the random variables to be Gaussian, with the variances for Y0, Et and ~, denoted by o'0, Pt and 
q,, respectively. The main result o be developed below is that the results obtained for the perfect 
measurement case can directly be used here, that is the problem features a "certainty equivalence" 
property. 
Towards showing this equivalence we first introduce the notation )t,=E{y, lt~t+~} =:EtYt where 
~,+ e=(z ' -  ', v3. It is a standard result (see, for example, Anderson and Moore, 1979) that ~, is given 
recursively by the Kalman filter equations: 
f, , = af, ,_ i + by, + [#,/(dr + qt)]r,; .f-1 = 0, (18a) 
r,,=z, - a.~,_ l - by,; v0,=0, (18b) 
6t + 1 = [a 2qt/(#t + qt)]fft + Pt + t ; #0 = a0. (18c) 
Here {r,} is the innovations process which has zero mean, is independent from stage to stage, and 
has variance var(r,)= q, + #,. Furthermore, #, admits the interpretation that 
#t,=var(y, - Et_ lY,) - min var(yt - #(lit)), 
where the minimization is over arbitrary (not necessarily inear) maps. 
Now, by following an argument similar to that used in LQG stochastic control (Bertsekas, 1976), 
we obtain the following sequence of equalities, where #,,=(z'-t, v t- i): 
z{( r , (0 , )  - y,+ = e{e,+¿ (v , -  + ),+, - y,+ 
= e{e,+, (v , -  + e{e ,+,  - 
= E{(e , (a , )  + + q,+,). 
Here the third equality has followed from the fact that the estimation error yt+ t - )3 t+ ~ has zero 
mean, and is orthogonal to any function of t~, + 5. Finally, using the above identity in (6) by noting 
that r/t could be replaced with ~t without affecting the underlying stochastic control problem, we 
arrive at the minimization problem 
T T 
)2}pt-, J r=  rain E E{(rt(t/t)-Pt+t + E {qt+~#,+l/(#,+~  q,+l)}P'-', (19) 
~Yt~ t~$ tm$ 
where the dynamic onstraint is now (18a). Since {r,} is an independent process, this is exactly the 
problem covered by Theorem 2.1, with only {y,} replaced by {p,}. Hence the certainty equivalence 
principle of stochastic control holds here, and the following counterpart of Theorem 2.1 readily 
follows: 
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Theorem 3. I 
(i) Let Condition 2.1 be satisfied. Then, the dynamic policy optimization problem (4), (6) with 
noisy measurements (r/,= z'-t) and with Gaussian distribution for all the random variables, admits 
the unique solution 
v*=7*(~, )=~t f , _~+f l ,  v _~, 2<<.t <~T; 
= mlm0.f0, t = 1; (20) 
where ~,, ft, mt are as defined in Theorem 2.1 and {.vt } is the sequence of estimates generated 
recursively by the Kalman filter (18). 
(ii) The minimum value in (6) is given, in view of (19), and using the variance for r, developed 
earlier, by 
j r  = 1<, + nlm~6~/(6 , + q,), (21a) 
where/~t is the last step of the backwards iteration 
~t-,  = pfc, + pn,mZ, f~/(a, + q,) q7 6,; 
~r = #r+ i. [] (21b) 
For the infinite horizon version of the problem, the analysis preceding Theorem 2.2 equally 
applies here (because of certainty equivalence), subject to some obvious modifications. The 
optimum stationary policy, replacing (15a), would be 
v, = 7"(77,) = - (a /b )y , _ ,  + (1/b)v,_,, (22) 
again provided that ab <~ 1/4. The corresponding equilibrium path {y*} is generated by 
y*=a(y*_ , -~*  , )+v,  t +G,  (23a) 
along with 
y?  -~- Vt_ I "[- [{~t/(~, dl- qt)]r,. (23b) 
Now, the important conclusion is that a relationship similar to (16a) also holds here: 
E,_,y*+~ =aE,_ l (y*  - f * )+v ,_ ,  
= v,_ t. (24) 
(Note that the last line follows because of the nestedness property of conditional expectations: 
E,_ ~*  =-E,_ I E, y* = E,_ ly*.) Hence, a solution to (1), when E,_ l is interpreted as conditional 
expectation under noisy measurements, i  provided by (23), along with (22). Note that this time 
we have a "three-dimensional" representation for the solution, as opposed to the "two- 
dimensional" representation i  the perfect measurement case. 
For t sufficiently large, and when q, and p, are constants, it is a standard result of linear filtering 
theory (see Anderson and Moore, 1979) that {#,} generated by (18c) converges to the positive root 
of the quadratic equation 
a 2 + (q - aZq -p )a  -- qp = 0, (25) 
say 6. Then, if we are sufficiently far away from either end, the per-stage steady-state prediction 
error variance yielded by the optimum stationary policy is 
var(y*._ ~ - Et_ ,y*+ ~) = p + a26q/(6 + q), 
which can again be shown [by a modified version of the argument used following (16b)] to be the 
minimum possible rror variance. Hence, we conclude this section with the following counterpart 
of Theorem 2.2: 
Theorem 3.2 
Let all parameters be time-invariant, and invoke the condition ab <<. 1/4. Then, the infinite 
horizon version of the dynamic policy optimization problem (4), (6) with noisy measurements, 
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admits a unique optimum stationary policy, given by (22) where {)3 t} is generated by (23b) with 
#, = # [the positive root of (25)] and r, = r. Furthermore, the corresponding path, generated by 
(23a), along with (the time-invariant version of) (23b) and (22), constitutes a minimum prediction 
error variance solution to (1). [] 
4. A DIRECT SOLUTION TO THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODEL 
In this section we work directly with the more traditional rational expectations model (1), which 
is obtained from (4) by restricting the policy variable to v, = Et_ ~ Yt + 1, for all t. Our objective here 
is f i rst  to show that the finite horizon version of (1) admits a unique solution under a general 
information pattern, second to obtain the limit of that solution as the time horizon becomes infinite, 
and f inal ly  to compare these results with those presented in the two previous sections. 
Let ~/, stand for any one of the two information patterns r/t = yt-  ~ or r/, = z t- ~, where zt was 
defined by (2). Let Et_ ~ Yt + 1 be the conditional expectation for y, + ~, given r/, of the perfect or noisy 
measurement type. We now seek a solution to the finite horizon rational expectations model: 
YT+I = ayT"I-ET+I 
y, = ay,_ l + bet_  i Yt -  l + Et, 
Let vt,=Et_ lYt+~, and note that 
leading to 
t ~< T. (26) 
Vr = Er_  t (ayr  + Er+ l ) = aEr_  l Yr  
= aEr_  l (ayr_  l + bvr + Er) = a2Er -  tY r -  l + abvr,  
Vr = [a2/(1 - ab )]Er_ lY r -  i =:crEr_  lY r - i ,  
provided that ab ~ 1. In view of this we now claim that every solution of (26) must have the 
property that 
v, = c,E,_ lY,+ l, t <~ T, 
for some unique sequence {c,}. The proof is by induction: assume that the claim is true for t + 1 
(it is clearly valid for T, as shown above) and show that this implies its validity for t. Towards 
this end, first note the following sequence of equalities: 
vt = E,_ i Yt + l = E,_ l (ay, + by, + l + E, + l ) 
-- gt_  l(ay, + bC,+l E ,y , )  
= (a + bct + i )E ,_  l Y, 
= (a + bc,+ I)E,_ t(ay,_ t + by, + E,) 
= (a + bc ,+ l ) (aE ,_ ly , _ l  + by,), 
where the second line follows by substitution of the asserted form for vt+~ and using the 
independence of E, + 1 from the past history of the process. The third line follows from the nestedness 
property of conditional expectations (E,_ rE , -  E,_ ~), and the fourth is a consequence of the 
measurability of v, with respect o the sigma field generated by r/,. Now, solving for v, from the 
above we obtain 
Vt = Ct Et - 1Yt - i, (27) 
which c, satisfies 
ct = a(a + bct+l)/[1 - b(a + bc,+l)]; Cr+l ffi 0, (28) 
provided that the denominator is nonsingular for all t. Hence the claim stands proven under this 
nonsingularity condition on the denominator, leading to the unique solution {y*} for (26), 
satisfying for t ~< T 
y*  = ay*  , + bc, Et_ ~y*_, + E,. (29) 
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It is interesting to note that the nonsingularity condition above is precisely Condition 2.1, since 
for all t ~< T 
1 - x t  a 
ct= b2 -~,  (30) 
where {x, } was defined by (7). Hence the dynamic policy optimization problems of Sections 2 and 
3, and the problem of obtaining a unique equilibrium path from (26) require the same existence 
condition, even though the resulting paths are quite different. To see this latter point more clearly, 
let us first consider the perfect information case, when Et_ IYt-1 = Yt-~ and hence (29) becomes 
y*  = (a + bct )y* l  + c, 
=- mty* l  + ¢t, (31) 
which should be contrasted with (13). In the noisy measurement case, with all the underlying 
distributions being Gaussian as in Section 3, we have Et_ IYt-  i = );, 1, where {p, } is generated by 
the Kalman filter (28) with vt = ctYt_ ~: 
¢ t=(a  +bct) f ' t  ~ +[#t / (#t+qt ) ] r t ;  f:_. =0, (32a) 
rt = zt - af't 1 - bctPt_ l, (32b) 
6,+ t = [aaqt/(#, + qt)]#t +P,+ 1; 60 = a0. (32c) 
In view of this, (29) becomes 
y*  = ay* l  + bctPt_l + Et, (33) 
which is again quite different from the path resulting from a substitution of the optimum policy 
(28) into (4) and (28). 
For the infinite horizon case, one has to study the asymptotic behavior of the sequence generated 
by (28). This, however, is equivalent o studying the asymptotic behavior of the sequence {xt}, 
because of the relationship (30). Hence the results of Section 3 (in particular, Lemma 3.1) can 
directly be used here to lead to the conclusion that for q:=ab <~ 1/4, {c~t.< r converges as T~,  
with the limit being 
lira e, r = ? = 1 - 2 t / -  (1 - 4r/) 1/2 r~ 2 (34) 
r 2b 2 - 
where fit is the limit of the sequence {m~t~ r generated by (10b). It is also interesting to note that 
above is identical with d_ introduced in Section 1. 
All the above are now summarized in the following theorem which, because of the foregoing 
discussion, does not require a proof. 
Theorem 4.1 
(i) Under Condition 2.1, and with the information pattern r l ,=y  ' - I  or r/t=z '-1, the fixed- 
terminal-time rational expectations model (26) admits the unique solution {y*} which is generated 
by (29), where the gain coefficient {ct} is determined recursively by (28). 
(ii) Under perfect measurements (r/t = y t- t), the unique solution of (26) satisfies (31), and under 
noisy measurements (~/t = zt-~) and with Gaussian distribution for all the random variables, the 
unique solution of (35) is generated by (22)-(23). 
(iii) As the time horizon becomes infinite, the unique solution {y*} above converges to {)Tt} 
generated by 
fit = aYt_ 1 + bEEt_ lYt-  I + g't, (35) 
provided that ab <~ 1/4. [Here ? is given by (34).] 
(iv) For the case r/, =y , - l ,  and the stationary {¢t}, the unique stationary limiting process is 
generated by 
y, = thy,_ l "4- ~l; ~ ,=a + bE. (36) 
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(v) For the case r/, = z'-1, and with Gaussian stationary distribution for {E,} and {¢,}, the unique 
stationary limiting process is generated by 
)7, = a)7,_ l - bE)~,_ I + E,, (37a) 
.~t = my, - I  "1- [o / (o  + q)][zt - -  f f t f i , _  1], (37b) 
provided that we are also sufficiently far away from the initial (starting) time. [Here 0 is the unique 
positive root of the quadratic equation (25).] [] 
A comparison of Theorem 4.1 above, and Theorems 2.1, 2.2 and 3.1, 3.2 presented earlier, clearly 
reveals a strong parallelism between the existence and convergence conditions of the underlying 
two seemingly different formulations, in spite of the fact that the solutions are significantly different. 
This provides yet another strong reason for the adoption of the dynamic policy optimization 
formulation, in place of the standard rational expectations model (8), since the former yields 
uniformly lowest stagewise prediction error variance for both the finite and the infinite horizon 
cases, and the conditions under which Theorems 2.1, 2.2 and 3.1, 3.2 are valid cannot be relaxed 
further, even if we restrict v, to be Et_ lY t+ I . 
5. EXTENSIONS 
A major advantage of the dynamic policy optimization formulation for rational expectations 
models, as introduced in the preceding sections, is that it can handle also higher order models, and 
those with nonlinearities. We have not dealt with such models in this paper mainly not to obscure 
the main message we wish to transmit; furthermore, though feasible, the infinite horizon 
convergence analysis of Lemma 2.1 would have been considerably more complicated for these more 
general models. Nevertheless, it would be of interest o consider here, for illustration purposes, the 
vector version of (1): 
y,  = Ay ,_  l + BEt- I Y, + 1 + C't, (38) 
where Yt,  E, are of dimension n, and A, B are n x n matrices. The sequence {E,} would be a 
vector-valued stochastic process, independent from stage to stage. The stochastic control formula- 
tion corresponding to this rational expectations model would be 
T 
min ~ E{(?,(t/,)-y,+~)'(~,(tl,)-y,+~)}p'-~=:J r, 
{~,} t=~ 
subject o 
Yt = Ay,_  l + Bvt + G; vt = ~t(rlt), t <~ T, 
Yr+l  = AyT+ ET+I, 
where prime denotes the transpose of a vector (or a matrix). One can show (by mimicking the 
derivation given in Appendix A for Theorem 2.1) that when ~/t=y '-1, and under a condition 
(replacing Condition 2.1) which is generically true, the problem admits a unique solution in the 
form 
vt*--'y*(yt-l, v t - l )= tgtYt_l-4- Ztvt_l, $ < t <~ T, 
= FIsY,- 1 , t -~" S, 
where {l-It}, {X,} are n x n dimensional matrix sequences which are determined recursively in 
retrograde time. The relevant expressions for these have been given in Appendix B. Again 
conditions on the parameters of the problem can be developed so that 
lim n,r=l"l; lira zr=~, 
T~ T-..* oO 
and hence a stationary policy would be 
v* -- l'[y,_ l + ~v,_ ~, 
C.A.M.W.A. 18/6-7--I 
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leading to the solution path 
y*  = (A + Bl'l)y*_~ + B]~v*, + e,, 
vt* = l'ly,*_l + ~v~* ,. 
It will, however, generally not be true that A + BI'] = 0 (as in the scalar case) unless B is 
nonsingular (i.e. invertible). Thus, in general, E * t- lYt+l :t=i),. 
The noisy measurement case, rl, = z t-  1, with 
z, = Hy,  + it ,  (39) 
where H is some (not necessarily square) matrix, and {~,} a Gaussian vector process independent 
from stage to stage, can also be accommodated into our approach without much difficulty. By 
following the reasoning iven prior to the statement of Theorem 3.1, it is not difficult to see that 
the problem features certainty equivalence. Hence the unique optimal solution to the noisy 
measurement case will be given by 
v*=7*(z '  l , v ' - l )=H,P ,  i+Z,v,_l; s<t<.T ,  
= Fls)3~_ i ; t =s,  
when the time horizon is [s, T]. Here p:=E{y,]z', v'} is the minimum mean square error estimator 
for y,,  generated recursively by the Kalman filter equations, in forward time (see Appendix B for 
the corresponding expressions). 
Another class of models to which our alternative formulation would be applicable are those 
models that involve not only two-step ahead but also one-step ahead prediction. In the scalar linear 
class, these could be written as 
Yt = ay,_ 1 Jf- bl Vlt "1- bzvz, + e,, (40) 
where vl, and v:, use the same information qt = Y ' -  i (perfect measurement case) or q, = z t- i (noisy 
measurement case), to predict the values of Y,+I and y,, respectively. This includes, for example, 
the asset market model considered by Blanchard and Kahn (1980). Towards a reasonable 
formulation for this problem, we adopt two dynamic riteria; one being j r  introduced in (6) with 
v, replaced by v,, and the other one being 
T 
min ~ E{(v2, _y , )2}p , -~,  (41) 
{~'2,} ,=s 
where in each case the minimization is subject o (38). We can view this as a two-level optimization 
problem where we first consider the solution of (41) for all {Vl,}, and then substitute this solution 
into (40) and also use it in j r  to obtain the best {Vl, } again as a solution of an optimization 
problem.? Now, it is not difficult to see that for every {v,} the unique solution to (41) under (40) 
is 
V2t = E,_ l Y,, t <~ T. (42) 
There are no spillover terms as in the two-step ahead prediction problem, and the error at each 
stage is independent of the past values of {v, }, {v2, } and {y, }. Substituting (42) into (40) we obtain 
y, = ay,_ 1 + b2E,-  lYt 4- bl Vl, Jr- £t, 
and taking the conditional expectation of both sides under the information pattern ~/,, we arrive 
at the equation 
gt - lY t  = ayt-1 + b2gt - lY t  + bl vl,, 
from which E,_ t Yt can be solved uniquely, provided that b2 # 1: 
1 
E,_ lY, = ~ [ay,_ 1 + bl Vlt]. 
?The approach adopted here is therefore one of Stackelberg equilibrium (see Ba~ar and Olsder, 1982). 
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Hence, the reduced version of (38) is 
Y, = aYr-~ + ~'v~, + e,, (43) 
where 
~,=a/(1-b2);  ~,=bl/ (1-b2).  
This shows that the second-level problem [i.e. j r  subject o (43)] is identical with the ones solved 
in Sections 2 and 3 (for the two information patterns), and thus the results of Theorems 2.1, 2.2 
and 3.1, 3.2 would be directly applicable here. 
Finally, the dynamic policy optimization approach of this paper would provide a natural set-up 
for the formulation of target tracking problems with forward looking models. As a simple 
illustration, consider the linear model 
Yt = ayt_ 1 + bvt + cw t -~ Et, 
with the same type of information, as earlier, available at every point in time. Here, v, and w, are 
both control variables, which are controlled by two different sets of agents, say A and B, 
respectively. A wishes to form an accurate (to the extent possible) two-step ahead predictor for y,, 
i.e. choose {v, } under a performance index of the type (6). B, on the other hand, wants to keep 
the trajectory {y, } as close to a desired target as possible. Letting {37, }denote this target rajectory, 
B's optimization problem could be formulated as 
T 
min E E {(Yt +, - 37t +l )2 ..[_ kw ~}pt-,, 
{. ' ,} t=~ 
where k > 0 is a measure of the tradeoff between target achievement and control energy. This is 
clearly a multi-objective optimization problem, better handled in the framework of (stochastic) 
dynamic game theory. Various solution concepts, uch as Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium 
and Pareto equilibrium, could be adopted here, depending on the particulars of the economic 
scenario leading to such a model. The results of this paper would not directly be applicable to this 
class of "forward looking" target racking problems, but they indeed provide us with considerable 
insight into the solution process. Details of policy optimization and game theoretic techniques 
applicable to such models will be developed and presented in future publications. For one recent 
publication on these extensions, using game theoretic techniques, ee Ba~ar (1989). 
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APPENDIX  A 
Proof of Theorem 2.1 
The proof follows from a standard ynamic programming argument, and therefore involves an induction on the time-to-go 
T - t. Towards this end, first consider the truncated objective functional (6) for any s, s < T. We assert hat 
j r=  min E{pn,+l(v,+l--m,+ly,+l)2 +(v,--Y,+l) 2} + pk,+l, (A.1) 
?s,?s + I 
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where n~+~, rn,+~ and k~+] are as defined in the theorem. The assertion is clearly true for s = T -1 ,  with 
n r = 1, mr= a, k r = var(~r+ t). Let us therefore assume its validity for general s, and prove it for s - 1. Since J~r_ I can be 
written as': 
j r  ,=  min E.~,_, (V,_ l -y~)2+ min E,~ p '+ ' -~(v , -y ,+t )  ~- , 
~',.Ts I ~ ' r}T= I + I t 
we clearly have, using the assertion for s, 
J L  t = rain E:,, _, {(v, _ ~ - y,)2 + min E,,, (p 2n s + t (v, + ~ - m s + ~ y, + ~ )2 + p (v, - y, + ~ ):} } + p 2k, +.. 
' /s ,; 's - I ys  + 1 
The inner minimization can be rewritten as 
E/,~, {rain E/n ' +, {pZn,+ ,(v,+ l - ms+ ,ay , -  ms+ ,bvs+ l) 2 + p(v,  - ay , -  by,+ ,)2}} 
Vs+l  
+ P 2n, + i m ~ + ] var(Es + i ) + P var(e, + i ), (A.2) 
which is a quadratic minimization problem in v,+~. Being strictly convex, it admits the unique solution (by simple 
differentiation with respect o v,+~) 
v, + 1 = {L°ns + l ms+ x a( 1 - bin,+ i) - ab ly ,  + bvs}/[pn , + 1(1 - bm,+ t) 2 + b 2] 
-= ~s+ lY~ + fl~+ ivs . 
This then justifies (7)-(9). Now, substitution of this solution into (A.2) yields an expression that is a complete square in 
vs and ys: 
pn~(v~ - m~v,)2 + p [pn~ + ~rn~+ 1+ l]var(Q +0. (A.3) 
Here 
n,= I -bfl,+~, 
m,=a/ ( l  -bm,+l  ), 
which are well defined under Condition 2.1. Finally, using (A.3) in j r  t, we have 
J r  I = rain E/ , , _ ,{pn~(v , -m,y~)2+(v~_~ _),,)2} +pk~,  
)'s,Ys + I 
which is in the same form as jr, thus completing the induction argument. Note that at the last step of the iteration, s = l, 
the second term in (A.2) would not be there, and hence the optimum solution would simply be the one annihilating the 
first squared term, clearly a linear function of only Y0. [] 
APPENDIX  B 
In this appendix we provide expressions for the gain coefficients {l-I, }, {~, }, as well as the Kalman filter equations for {33, }, 
both introduced in Section 5. In what follows A'  denotes the transpose of a generic matrix A, and I denotes the identity 
matrix of an appropriate dimension. 
Express ions fo r  { H, }, {Z, } 
{H,}r=l and {;f,}r= I are uniquely generated by 
n, = -[p(i - Mtn) 'U , ( l  - ACTS) + S 'n l - l [ s "  -- p ( I  -- MtB) 'N ,  Mt IA  
3ft = [p( l  -- M ,B) 'N , ( I  - M ,B)  + B 'B] -~B ' 
where {Mr} and {N,} are generated recursively by 
Nt - i  = l -  B~t; Nr= L 
M,_ .  = [I + p ( l  - BX , ) -~; ( I  - M ,B) 'N ,M,  IA;  Mr  = A. 
In the scalar case, I'I,, Z,, N, and M t were denoted by ~,, fl,, n, and m,, respectively, in Theorem 2.1. Note that what replaces 
Condition 2.1 in the vector case is the nonsingularity of {N,}, assuming that B'B  > O. 
Ka lman f i l ter  equat ion fo r  {33,} 
Let the time horizon be [0, T], and Y0 be a Gaussian random vector with mean zero and covariancc Z0. Let {Yt} be the 
vector process generated by (38), and {z,} be the measurement process given by (39). Then 33:=E[y,]z t, vq  is generated by 
33t = A33,-i + Bvt + ~.tH' (H~. ,  H '  + R) - l r t ;  33-t = O, 
r, = z, - HA33t_ i - HBvt ;  vo'=O, 
~.t+t = A in ' t -  ~ ' ,H ' (H~' tH '  + R) - IH~, ]  A" + P, 
~o = Zo, 
where 
R,=cov(~,), P,=cov(~,). 
?E,,, denotes the conditional expectation, with respect to the sigma-field generated by q, -- y'- '. 
